Research Articles

The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

Autores/as

  • Arijit Mukherjee University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK, and CESifo, Germany
  • Leonard F.S. Wang Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006

Resumen

In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.

Palabras clave:

  • R&D tournament
  • Excessive entry
  • Insufficient entry

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Biografía del autor/a

Arijit Mukherjee, University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK, and CESifo, Germany

Reader and Associate Professor, University of Nottingham Professor of Economics and Chairman, York University (January 1, 2012)

Leonard F.S. Wang, Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung

Professor of Economics

Citas

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Recibido

2011-10-25

Aceptado

2011-11-15

Publicado

2011-11-24

Cómo citar

Mukherjee, A., & Wang, L. F. (2011). The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament. Journal of Technology Management and Innovation, 6(4), 73–79. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006

Número

Vol. 6 Núm. 4 (2011)

Sección

Research Articles

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2011 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation

Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-CompartirIgual 4.0.

 

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