The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
Keywords:R&D tournament, Excessive entry, Insufficient entry
AbstractIn a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.
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